War and Peace Blog

Blog post #15, 21 May 2024

Last Monday, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in The Hague announced its intention to issue arrest warrants against leaders of both Israel and Hamas for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The announcement was met with anger from both sides. Neither side wants its violence to be painted with the same brush as that of their opponent. Both consider their own violence to be justified and defensive, and that of the other, illegitimate and offensive. Both parties think of themselves as the victim and the other as the aggressor.

These discursive dynamics are a common feature of political violence and terrorism. Another is the interactive nature of such violence, with state and non-state actors responding to one another in a cycle of violence and counter-violence. The history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict illustrates this well. Attacks from either side cannot be understood without reference to this interactive history and context. Hamas and Israel are locked in a ‘violent dialogue’ in which innocent civilians are the real victims. As such, it makes sense for the ICC to link the parties together in the same announcement.

Take the strategy of Hamas. It is very likely that the group anticipated Israel’s harsh reprisal to its brutal October 7^th attack. Hamas appears to have hoped that widespread Israeli counter-violence would sabotage Israel’s strategy of establishing ties with Arab states and increase global sympathy for the Palestinian cause. And once the Israeli war on Gaza had begun, Hamas knowingly increased the risk of civilian casualties by launching attacks from schools and hospitals in at least some cases (though it should be added that Israeli claims to this effect were proven wrong on several occasions). Ordinary Gazans are the victim of both sides in this war.

Hamas and Israel are locked in a ‘violent dialogue’ in which innocent civilians are the real victims.

                  Such provocation, aiming at a violent and oppressive state response to corrode the legitimacy of one’s opponent, is one of the main ‘strategic logics’ of terrorism by non-state actors that lack the resources and popular support to launch an all-out rebellion. The question is, however, how successful it ultimately is. Historically, non-state terrorism has often succeeded in provoking violent responses, but this has rarely led to the achievement of groups’ ultimate political aims. The same appears to be the case today. Although a growing number of countries recognizes the Palestinian state, the international community has stood by while the expansion of Israeli settlements decreased the viability of such a state. Despite pressure from their own pro-Palestinian populations, Arab states have shown no inclination to halt their process of rapport with Israel. Israel’s allies, though increasingly critical of Israel’s unsparing operation in Gaza, continue to stand by the country. The new Dutch government-in-the-making has signaled its support for Israel by stating that it wants to “study” the possibility of moving its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

A non-violent protest movement in the tradition of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, using demonstrations, sit-ins, and strikes, might have acquired a mass following and received global sympathy in a way that terrorism never will.

Hannah Arendt wrote that the most likely outcome of violence is more violence. Indeed, a spiral of violence and counter-violence often follows terrorism, as the War on Terror has shown. The late Palestinian-American professor Edward Said, while highly critical of Israel and its allies, also wrote that the biggest mistake of the Palestinian resistance had been their choice for terrorism over non-violent resistance. A non-violent protest movement in the tradition of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, using demonstrations, sit-ins, and strikes, might have acquired a mass following and received global sympathy in a way that terrorism never will. (Recall that international boycotts of the South African apartheid government were only announced after the opposition, led by Nelson Mandela, had switched from a violent to a non-violent strategy.) Ongoing demonstrations in Georgia, where protesters hope to repeat the success of the 2003 Rose Revolution, are a current-day example. A peaceful resistance campaign may also have put severe pressure on Israel: think how its economy would suffer if the many Palestinian labourers in Israel would hold a strike. Indeed, research has shown that non-violent resistance is twice as often successful as violent resistance.

                  Israel, too, would benefit from a more conciliatory approach. Its increasingly harsh treatment of the Palestinians has contributed to escalation of the conflict. Over the years, Israeli repressive actions against Palestinians have increased the number and lethality of terrorist attacks by non-state groups*). This is in line with a large body of research finding states that employ repressive and violent policies to be more likely to be targeted by terrorism. Such policies tend to escalate conflicts and foster anger, hatred, and grievances. Discrimination, physical repression, and the closing of non-violent avenues of political action increase the likelihood of non-state terrorism.**)

Let us hope that future Israeli and Palestinian leaders will heed these lessons and choose de-escalation over violence.

*) E.g. Hsu, H., & McDowall, D. (2020). Examining the state repression-terrorism nexus: Dynamic relationships among repressive counterterrorism actions, terrorist targets, and deadly terrorist violence in Israel. Criminology & Public Policy, 19, 483-514; Dugan, L., & Chenoweth, E. (2012). Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of Raising the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel. American Sociological Review, 77(4), 597-624; Sharvit, K., Kruglanski, A. W., Wang, M., Chen, X., Boyatzi, L. M., Ganor, B., & Azani, E. (2013). The effects of Israeli use of coercive and conciliatory tactics on Palestinian’s use of terrorist tactics: 2000–2006. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways Toward Terrorism and Genocide, 6, 22-44.

**) E.g. Piazza, J. (2017). Repression and Terrorism: A Cross-National Empirical Analysis of Types of Repression and Domestic Terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 29, 102-118; Walsh, J., & Piazza, J. (2010). Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism. Comparative Political Studies, 43(3), 551-577; Rosendorff, P., & Sandler, C. (2004). Too much of a good thing? The proactive response dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48, 657-671; Bueno de Mesquita, E., & Dickson, E. (2007). The propaganda of the deed: Terrorism, counterterrorism, and mobilization. American Journal of Political Science, 51(2), 634-381.